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Introduction
The present work analyzes why retailers (supermarket
chains) are less willing to vary their sale prices of pe-
rishable food products when the price they pay to their
supplier (farming-marketing firm) falls due to over-
production than when there is a shortage of produce.
Several theories have attempted to explain pri-
ce rigidity and asymmetry: see e.g. Meyer and Von
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) and Vavra and Goodwin
(2005) for recent literature reviews. Market power, that
is the existence of non-competitive structures, is one
of the most widely analyzed (Ward, 1982; Neumark
and Sharpe, 1992; Peltzman, 2000). From another
point of view, imperfect information means that a price
increase at production level serves as information for
natural coordination between companies. However, not
knowing competitors’ strategies induces retailers to
maintain prices while there is an acceptable volume of
demand (Borenstein et al., 1997). On the other hand,
the internal structure of costs may mean that a company
Retail price rigidity in perishable food products: a case study
J. C. Perez-Mesa1*, E. Galdeano-Gomez2 and J. A. Aznar-Sanchez2
1  Departamento de Dirección y Gestión de Empresas. Universidad de Almería. La Cañada de San Urbano. 
04120 Almería. Spain
2  Departamento de Economía Aplicada. Universidad de Almería. La Cañada de San Urbano. 04120 Almería. Spain
Abstract
Why are retailers less likely to vary sale prices of food products when the price paid to the farmer falls than when
it rises? As far as perishable goods are concerned, this behavior is usually related to the retailer’s bargaining power.
With a view to analyzing the question in greater depth, this study presents a simplified framework considering an ideal
scenario in which the retailer wishes to maintain balanced profits due to external pressures or other factors, such as a
competitive distribution market. In the face of changing supply, the price-fixing decision of the distributor may also
depend on the risk, measured by the relationship between demand elasticity and variable costs, as a result of uncertainty
in consumer response to price variations. The simulation of these scenarios is carried out taking as reference the Spanish
tomato market. The results of these applications allow to see that despite a relaxation of bargaining power, price
asymmetry is not avoided. This work shows the difficulty for suppliers and retailers to reach agreements which could
result in competitive advantages.
Additional key words: demand elasticity; farmer supply; risk.
Resumen
Rigidez de precios minoristas en productos perecederos: un caso de estudio
¿Por qué cuando el precio pagado al agricultor baja, los precios de venta detallista, de los productos alimenticios,
varían en menor proporción que cuando éste aumenta? En los productos perecederos este comportamiento se rela-
ciona, generalmente, con el poder de negociación del minorista y con su estructura de costes. Con el objetivo de pro-
fundizar en esta cuestión, este estudio presenta un marco simplificado considerando un escenario en el que el mino-
rista desea mantener los beneficios equilibrados debido a presiones externas o a la existencia de una fuerte competencia
entre las propias cadenas de distribución. En esta situación, el minorista se enfrenta a un aumento del riesgo como
consecuencia del desconocimiento de la demanda que justifica un movimiento asimétrico de precios. Adicionalmen-
te, se realiza una simulación tomando como referencia el mercado español de tomate. Los resultados muestran que
pese a la «relajación» del escenario que supone un mayor poder de negociación de las cadenas con sus proveedores,
no se evita que se produzcan asimetrías de precios. En este trabajo se aprecia la dificultad de materializar acuerdos
de precios entre minoristas y proveedores que pudieran redundar en ventajas competitivas.
Palabras clave adicionales: elasticidad de demanda; oferta del agricultor; riesgo.
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enjoying a comfortable f inancial situation delays
dropping prices as it can afford to take the risk of main-
taining higher prices than its competitors (Bedrossian
and Moschos, 1998). The theory of change of nominal
prices, also known as «menu cost» has also attracted
considerable attention (Ball and Mankiw, 1994; Blinder
et al., 1998). The cost associated with the change in
prices (required labor or materials) has proven to be
relevant when deciding to maintain prices stable (Levy
et al., 1997, 2002; Owen and Trzepacz, 2002). From a
theoretical point of view, Gardner’s model (1975) is a
very useful tool which allows us to know the effects
on the retailer-producer price spread of variations in
final demand, production at origin and marketing costs.
Kinnucan and Forker (1987) use the context of Gardner’s
model to explain the influence of changes in the pro-
ducer’s supply on retail prices, finding evidence that
final sale prices vary more slowly with lower cost at origin
than with higher cost.
In the context of perishable goods, Ward (1982)
considers that perishability can be an important source
of asymmetric transmission, because retailers could
avoid raising prices for fear of being left with a spoiled
product. Sexton and Zhang (1996) point out that with
a relatively fixed (inelastic) supply, retailers can reduce
the prices they pay by a relatively large amount before
suppliers are no longer willing to bring their goods to
market1. This implies that the retailer’s relative bargai-
ning power seems more plausible in an industry that
deals with perishable and unstorable products (Acharya,
2000).
Despite a large number of studies that have inves-
tigated the phenomenon of price transmission in food
markets, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions
upon which policy decisions could be based. Although
many studies seeking imperfect price transmission
have found support for it, the evidence is often mixed
and varies widely across commodities and countries
(Vavra and Goodwin, 2005).
The main aim of the present work is to study the
retailer pricing behavior in greater depth, taking as
reference the retailer price rigidity observed in the
Spanish fresh tomato market (Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, MAPA, 2003). We develop a com-
prehensive and simplif ied framework, based on an
initial situation of behavior that could be termed «ideal»,
in which retailer and supplier agree to maintain their
profits. In other words, a situation in which the relative
bargaining power of the retailer may be offset by ex-
ternal pressures or other factors such as a competitive
distribution market. In this way, we intend to determine
what effects this type of behavior would have on price
asymmetry: whether it would be eliminated, or on the
contrary would still persist. A further aim is to deter-
mine whether such agreements are feasible and able to
be stable in time. The model developed allows testing
different scenarios and is analyzed in an empirical
application.
Methodology
In a first scenario, it is assumed that neither the retailer
nor the supplier should lose income in situations of
varying supply (assumption «a»). We contemplate an
alternative scenario in which the retailer will try to
maintain a situation of balanced profit for both parties
in order to avoid the intervention of the administration
or pressure from producer organizations (Maloni and
Brown, 2008). These pressure groups identify asymme-
tries of prices and price gap between origin and des-
tination with non-egalitarian bargaining between retai-
ler and supplier2. In this first model we also assume
that total production is marketed (assumption «b»).
These assumptions could even be true in a competi-
tive market. Thus, for example, due to a strong compe-
tition between retailers, these might have a vested
interest in integrating producers into their supply chain
in order to create synergies in the optimization of logis-
tics or improvements in the quality of supply (Marcus
and Anderson, 2006). In Spain such a case can be seen
in the strategy adopted by the Mercadona supermarket
chain (Blanco and Gutiérrez, 2008). Acting in such a
way could be beneficial for the retailer by differen-
1 On the other hand, if supply is highly responsive (elastic), then a similar pricing strategy will mean that retailers are left with
little to sell to consumers and their total profit falls accordingly.
2 For instance, bargaining power of retailer in the Spanish tomato market is derived from the predominance in the marketing process
of small cooperative firms. In Almería alone, which is the leading area of production in Spain with a production and sales volume
of around 12,000 tonnes, there are 47 such firms (FEPEX, 2009). This means that most of the firms, which bargain individually,
sell their tomatoes to common clients, which are the large retailers or purchase centres for multinational distribution chains: Tesco,
Aldi, Rewe or Carrefour (Pérez-Mesa, 2007). These companies have access to supplies in different parts of the world, and fair
bargaining between small producers and purchasers with great availability of resources is clearly unlikely.
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tiating them from the competition (Bhatnagar and Teo,
2009). As Fearne and Hughes (1999) point out, main-
taining the supplier’s profits is a factor of competiti-
veness. This implies that the retailer will have to attempt
to maintain the supplier’s prof it and to coordinate
supplies (assumptions that are contemplated in the
empirical application of the paper). Indeed, this situa-
tion might arise even maintaining institutional pressure:
in this framework, retailers that best integrate their
supplier in the supply chain would be more competitive.
In a second scenario assumption b. is «relaxed»,
allowing for demand to be different to supply, or that
demand is unknown. This is a common scenario for the
fruit and vegetables market, as consumer demand is
very sensitive to substitute products (even within the
same family) or is affected by climatic factors (cold or
heat, as in the case of melon and water melon). Varia-
bility of demand, especially when dealing with data
reported for periods under one year as in the framework
of the present analysis, has been shown by Galdeano
(2005) and De Pablo et al. (2008). In these scenarios,
the question is: What causes rigidity in retail price?
Specifically we focus attention on demand elasticity,
as a component of risk, which changes as a consequen-
ce of variations in the quantity supplied, using the
structure of variable costs of producer and retailer as
a method of transmission.
Backgrounds of differences in pricing
behavior
The relationship between farm and retail prices has
been the subject of numerous research studies that aim
to understand why sales margin for food products
change over time. The causes of differences in the way
that the retail price adjusts to an increase or decrease
in farm price and vice versa, i.e. asymmetry and rigidity
in prices, have been analyzed from different perspec-
tives. These analyses can be categorized as: models of
imperfect vertical or horizontal competition, models
based on the firm’s internal structure (costs, invento-
ries, performance) and other miscellaneous models
(e.g. those based on the nature of the product or on
state intervention). Regarding analytical approach, we
find deductive theoretical models (Gardner type) and
empirical ones (econometric or inductive). The former
analyzes the relationship between farm and retail
prices, but they seldom reflect reality, while the latter
can detect real asymmetry, but they do not provide a
formal explanation of it.
The main cause identified by the literature for rigi-
dity and asymmetry in farm-retail price is the presence
of non-competitive behavior, i.e. market power (imper-
fect competition). The argument for this rests on the fact
that supply chains for food products are often much
less concentrated at the farm level than higher up. This
is, therefore, imperfect competition of a vertical type
in which larger firms (retailers) take advantage of their
bargaining power in the relationship with suppliers.
This could cause oligopolistic processors and retailers
to react collusively and transmit more rapidly shocks
that squeeze their margin than shocks that stretch it
(Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Market power
will thus lead to positive asymmetry3 in an oligopolistic
retail environment: costs and retail margins increase
as retail margins are squeezed, whereas cost decreases
will not be instantaneously transmitted to price de-
creases because firms maintain prices above the com-
petitive level (Borestein et al., 1997).
Nevertheless, it may also be possible to justify price
asymmetry due to horizontal competition among retai-
lers. Authors such as Bailey and Brorsen (1989) argue
that market concentration will lead to positive or nega-
tive asymmetry: if a firm believes that competitors will
match an increase in output prices, but not an equiva-
lent reduction, positive asymmetry transmission will
result. On the other hand, if a f irm believes that no
competitor will match a price increase but all will
match a price cut, negative asymmetry will result. In
a similar context, Balke et al. (1998), and Brown and
Yücel (2000) consider oligopolistic firms that engage
in unspoken collusion to maintain higher profits; risk
of provoking a price war may make firms reluctant to
lower prices, and price adjustment might take place
only after some lags. In this case, when input prices
rise, each firm will quickly adjust prices upwards to
signal that collusion will be maintained, whereas they
will wait to lower output prices to avoid undermining
a tacit agreement.
Alternative explanations for differences in pricing
behavior are due to the adjustment costs and the firm’s
3 Following Peltzman (2000), asymmetry can be classified as either positive or negative. Considering a simplified farm-retailer
scenario, if retail price reacts more fully or rapidly to an increase in farm price than to a decrease, the asymmetry is termed positive.
Correspondingly, negative asymmetry denotes a situation in which retail price reacts more fully or rapidly to a decrease in farm
price than to an increase.
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internal structure. The costs of labeling, advertising or
promoting goodwill makes the re-marking of prices
expensive. Thus, the reaction to a given rise in price
might take place with some delay. Authors such as Ball
and Mankiw (1994), and Zachariasse and Bunte (2003)
have stressed the importance of the menu costs of re-
marking prices, such as the cost of reprinting catalo-
gues. Blinder (1982) and Balke et al. (1998) based their
models on inventory management as the cause of firm
adjustment to exogenous shocks. Baley and Brorsen
(1989) show that certain firms face significant fixed
costs (e.g. packers), and in the short run, profit margins
may be reduced in an attempt to keep a plant operating
at or near full capacity; therefore, as a result of compe-
tition between different packers, farm prices may be
bid up more quickly than down. On the other hand,
Peltzman (2000) argues that it is easier for a firm to
reduce inputs in the case of an output reduction than
it is to recruit new inputs to increase output. Other ex-
planations are related to different levels of profitability,
which can lead to asymmetry according to Bedrossian
and Moschos (1998): if a firm is relatively profitable,
then it can take greater risks in delaying a price adjust-
ment to a fall in input prices. The model of Ball and
Mankiw (1994) uses inflation as an explanation for
asymmetric price transmission: in this case, firms would
increase prices to correct for accumulated and antici-
pated inflation; however, transmission of negative
shocks would be less necessary as inflation would
already have adjusted the prices.
There are some additional theories which explain
the existence of differences in price adjustment4.
Kinnucan and Forker (1987) explain how government
intervention can lead to asymmetric price adjustments.
Processors and retailers may believe that a reduction
in price may be temporary because it will trigger go-
vernment intervention through support prices. In this
context, processors and retailers will not react to a
reduction in farm prices but they will believe it is more
likely to be permanent. Psychological pricing points,
as suggested by Blinder et al. (1998), could have an
analogous influence on price transmission.
Finally, Acharya (2000), and Sexton and Zhang (1996)
have reported perishability of goods as an important
factor in the buyer-retailer’s ability to influence market
prices. Sexton and Zhang (1996) argue that the scarcity
rent is allocated between farmers and buyers based on
their relative bargaining power, which seems more
plausible in an industry that deals with perishable and
unstorable products. Ward (1982) suggests that retailers
might hesitate to raise prices for fear of reduced sales
leading to spoilage. While Heien (1980) argues that
changing prices is less of a problem for perishable
products than it is for those with a long shelf life, be-
cause for the latter changing prices incurs higher time
costs and losses of goodwill.
From a theoretical point of view, Kinnucan and Forker
(1987) and Von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) consider
asymmetries in the framework of the marketing margin
model developed by Gardner (1975). In this model, the
farm-retail price spread depends on shifts in both
retail-level demand and farm-level supply. Under con-
ditions of perfect competition and constant returns to
scale, Gardner deduces a stronger impact of retail-level
demand shifts than of farm-level supply shifts on the
farm-retail price spread.
From a purely practical point of view, numerous
research has concentrated on the identification methods
and the magnitude of the changes in the farm price
reflected in the retail price and vice versa. (see e.g. Vavra
and Goodwin, 2005, for a comprehensive review).
In general, despite wide coverage of this topic in the
literature, the one indisputable conclusion is that more
research is needed in order to understand the increasingly
complicated relationships among prices along the supply
chain and the underlying behavior of agents (Meyer
and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).
This paper provides additional explanations to those
exposed above, in particular for perishable products in
short time intervals. The scheme proposed changes the
role of costs as they generate asymmetry in prices
(Fig. 1). By using a simplified model, we attempt to
minimize the influence of the afore mentioned main
causes of differences in pricing behavior, even assu-
ming that both the farming-marketing f irm and the
retailer wish to maintain a balanced marketing profit
margin. In addition, we try to find empirical justifica-
tion for the theoretical analytical framework.
Theoretical framework
As expounded in the introduction, several assumptions
are considered in our framework. First, a simplified
marketing chain, with direct sales from the supplier
(farming-marketing firm-industry) to the retailer (su-
4 Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) name these additional explanations as «miscellaneous».
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permarket chain)5 is considered, meaning that there are
no intermediaries to distort the relationship between
retailer and supplier. Second, the potential for retailer’s
bargaining power is compensated, leading to a scena-
rio in which neither the retailer (supermarket) nor the
supplier should lose income in situations of varying
supply and when the total production is marketed. As
mentioned above, this scenario can result from the
pressure of government intervention and producer or-
ganizations or to competitive retailer strategies to inte-
grate suppliers6. We therefore start from a situation of
balanced marketing profit margins in which no pressu-
re is applied to force prices up or down. Thirdly, in re-
lation to the previous two, we assume that the adjust-
ment cost for the retailer is only important in logistic
terms (as the main variable cost)7.
Profit for supplier and retailer
The supplier is a food marketing firm with a lineal
function of cost production, Cst (qt) = csqt + ws, where qt
is the quantity marketed at time t, cs is the unit variable
cost, and ws is the fixed cost. If we denote by Ist (qt) the
obtained income at time t, then the expected profit pits
at time t is:
where pst is the sale price at time t. The objective of this
firm is to maintain a stable balance of profit over time,
then
[1]
Annex 1 shows the theoretical implications of con-
dition [1] for pst.
Now we consider a retailer firm with a lineal func-
tion of cost production, Crt (qt) = (cr + pst)qt + wr, where
cr is the unit variable cost and wr is the fixed cost. The
expected profit of the retailer pirt at time t is:
where prt is the sales price to consumers. In order to
maintain the retailer’s own profit and that of the supplier
over time, we estimate the sale price prt knowing that
[2]
where pro and qo are retail sale price and marketed
amount at the start of the period studied. Therefore,
the price-demand elasticity which the retailer must
withstand to fulfil all the requirements is:
[3]
Annex 2 shows the theoretical implications of con-
dition [2] for prt and εrt.
So far we have assumed that the whole offer is
absorbed by demand: qt = qmt, where qmt is the amount
demanded by the market. However, henceforth we shall
consider that demand is different to supply:
[4]
Using data from a period of less than one year as in
this analytical framework, it is extremely difficult to
establish a relationship like [4] for perishable produce,
since there is great seasonal variability: this circums-
tance has been dealt with at length by Galdeano (2005)
and De-Pablo et al. (2008). In certain cases we could
speak of demand that is difficult to calculate or even
unknown. In this situation, εrt would be a measure used
to calculate the retailer’s risk8 or a minimum threshold
that the retailer should take in order to maintain the
retailer’s own profit and that of the supplier. The risk
taken would be equal to prob(εmt < εrt) = F(εrt), where F(.)
is the probability distribution9 of , i.e. theεt
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=
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Figure 1. Scheme of work.
Traditional vision
Cost structure Increased risk Price asymmetry
New scheme
5 In fact, this situation is close to reality in the case of tomato marketing in Southeast Spain, which is taken as reference in our
application (Pérez-Mesa, 2007).
6 This is in line with new trends of vertical integration in the distribution chain (MAPA, 2003). Unlike Gardner’s formulation,
which distinguishes between quantities of produce at supplier and retail levels, it is assumed that the total production is marketed,
as usually occurs in contracts between farm-marketing firms and supermarkets in Spanish fresh tomato distribution.
7 There are no additional costs of product storage (considering perishable products), re-marking prices or others.
8 This definition of risk is in the line of the concept and measure as described by Hardaker (2000) and Just (2003).
9 Increasing monotone.
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real market elasticity as a result of the changes in the
price fixed by the retailer in agreement with the supplier.
By way of example, if demand were to follow an expo-
nential function qmt = α · prt exp(b), then b = εmt, i.e.
market elasticity would be constant over time.
As commented above, the situation where εmt < εrt
would imply that the retailer could not maintain cons-
tant profit, which would lead to a break in the pact with
the supplier.
It should be noted that if conditions [1] and [2] are
fulfilled, there will be an effect on supplier-retail price
spread (mt = prt – pst), and this verified below in an empi-
rical way. Annex 3 shows the theoretical consequences.
Results
Application and simulation
Using the described scenarios, we make a simulation
based on the price asymmetry observed in the fresh
tomato marketing chain in Spain. We consider a far-
ming-marketing firm of tomato (cooperative or a mar-
keting organization, which the farmers own) which
supplies directly to a supermarket chain in the northeast
of Spain. The sources of both variable and fixed costs
are: production and handling at origin (Salinas and Palao,
2002; Pérez-Mesa, 2007), and logistics of supermarket
(MAPA, 2003). The initial retail sale price is calculated
applying a 20% increase on the variable cost of the
supermarket (MAPA, 2003).
Week 1: A balanced scenario
In the initial situation a supermarket chain makes a
weekly purchase of 335 tons of tomatoes at €680 ton–1.
As described above and for the sake of simplification,
the supermarket chain only has to bear the cost derived
from logistics (€210 ton–1), the price paid to the pro-
ducer (€680 ton–1) and a fixed cost of €37,18510. The
farming-marketing firm has to face a variable cost of
€490 ton–1 and a weekly fixed cost of €46,900. The
retail sale price is €1,070 ton–1. The supermarket
knows that at this price it will be able to sell the 335
tons and maintain a balanced profit, i.e. a situation in
which no pressure exists to force prices up or down.
Table 1 shows a summary of the initial scenario. The
supermarket chain will obtain a weekly prof it of
€23,115, while the farming-marketing f irm makes
€16,750.
Week 2a: Increased supply and retailer negotiation
Now we suppose that in the following week there is
an increase in production (for example, as a result of
meteorological factors which speed up fruit ripening
Table 1. Results of the simulations
Assumptions Week 1 Week 2.a Week 2.b
(t) (t+1) (t+1)
[1] Sale price (€ ton–1) 1,070 1,070 946
[2] Demand (ton) 335 335 503
[3] = [1] × [2] Income from sales (€) 358,450 358,450 476,050
[4] Logistics costs (€/t) 210 210 210
[5] = [3] × [2] Total logistics costs (€) 70,350 70,350 105,630
[6] Price paid to farming-marketing firm (€ ton–1) 680 500 617
[7] = [6] × [2] Income of farming-marketing firm i(€) = Rest of variable 
costs of supermarket (€) 227,800 167,500 310,120
[8] = [5] + [7] Total costs of supermarket (€) 298,150 237,850 415,750
[9] = [3] – [8] Supermarket profit margin (€) 60,300 120,600 60,300
[10] Fixed costs of supermarket (€) 37,185 37,185 37,185
[11] = [9] – [10] Total profit of supermarket 23,115 83,415 23,115
[12] Variable costs of farming-marketing firm (€ ton–1) 490 490 490
[13] = [7] – [12] × [2] Profit margin for farming-marketing firm (€) 63,650 3,350 63,650
[14] Fixed costs of farming-marketing firm 46,900 46,900 46,900
[15] = [13] – [14] Total profit of farming-marketing firm 16,750 –43,550 16,750
10 Estimating 11% of the total weekly costs (MAPA, 2003).
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or because the crop has been badly planned). The
farming-marketing firm is now able to sell to the super-
market chain 503 tons (50% more than in the previous
week). This increase in production has been general 
in the whole production area and so reference prices
(e.g. prices in a local wholesale market) have dropped.
The supermarket negotiates a lower purchase price,
which is f inally established at €500 ton–1. At this 
price the supermarket may obtain more prof it than 
the previous week if they buy 335 tons at a price of
€500 ton–1 as opposed to €680 ton–1. The second
column in Table 1 includes the extreme situation in
which the supermarket continues to buy the same as
in week 1.
Week 2b: Increased supply and balance of profits
In order to avoid government intervention, or pressure
from producer organizations11, or even as a business
strategy, the supermarket decides to purchase at a
higher price than in assumption 2.a (but lower than in
assumption 1) in order to maintain the same balance
of profits as before absorbing the increase in supply12.
To do so, the retailer needs to sell at a minimum price
of €946 ton–1, and to purchase from the supplier at
€617 ton–1. This means that the supermarket chain
would have to lower the retail sale price by 12% in order
to increase sales by 50%. In other words, the expected
quantity-price elasticity is –4.342. What would happen
if the demand responded to less elasticity? The super-
market chain would make less profit than in the first
week.
Sensitivity analysis
There are intermediate strategies between those
exposed for weeks 1, 2a and 2b. Given the excess in
production, the farming-marketing firm might think
that the supermarket will act fairly, as in the above
example. In this case it might send less quantity to the
supermarket, thinking that they will respond by lowe-
ring retail sale prices in order to obtain the same results
as in week 1. Table 2 reflects the different strategies of
retail sale prices, prices of liquidation to the supplier
and tons sold, without affecting the supermarket’s
profits with respect to week 1. In parallel, Figure 2 shows
the minimum elasticity to which demand should respond
if both supermarket and supplier are to maintain the
profits made in week 1.
In view of these data, if the supermarket wants to
be fair to the supplier given any variation in production,
Table 2. Summary of possible strategies to obtain identical profits to week 1 (Cs = 210 € ton–1)
Variation Price paid to Difference between Minimum demand
in production Tons sold Retail price farming-marketing price at origin elasticity
(%) firm and retail price necessary
50 503 946 617 329 –4.342
40 469 964 626 338 –4.049
30 436 984 636 348 –3.764
20 402 1,008 648 360 –3.470
10 369 1,036 662 374 –3.185
5 352 1,052 671 381 –3.039
1 338 1,067 678 389 –2.918
2.00
2.50
3.00
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4.50
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5.50
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% Variation in production
El
as
tic
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2.92
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–1
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–1
Figure 2. Relationship between the minimum elasticity requi-
red (in absolute value) and the % variation in marketed and sold
produce.
11 This often takes the form of protest or bad press regarding the supermarkets’ attitude.
12 This situation is also feasible from a monopolistic point of view in the case of tomato, since in Spain one single town (Almería)
accounts for over 40% of national marketed tomato during the winter season.
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it should subject itself to market uncertainty, which
demands an elasticity of at least 2.9. For example,
according to Table 2, if the supermarket decides to
market 10% more quantity as the supplier has excess
product, its sale price should be 2.6% lower in so
consumers purchase the extra 10%.
Any positive variation in the total variable costs
would displace the elasticity curve upwards (Fig. 2).
Thus, for example, if the logistics cost increased to
€270 ton–1, to market 503 tons (50% more than in
week 1) a minimum elasticity of 5.183 would be
required. A reduction in the cost of logistics to €150
ton–1 would reduce the necessary elasticity to sell 503
tons to 3.736.
In short, given a situation of incomplete information
or uncertainty, the supermarket may take the risk of
lowering prices assuming that there is no guarantee
that the increase in demand will compensate the in-
crease in costs.
Decreased supply
Finally, we suppose that there is a decrease in pro-
duction with respect to week 1. If the supermarket
continues buying the total production from the supplier,
it would have to pay a higher price than in week 1,
which would compensate the farming-marketing firm
for the decrease in marketed tons. The supermarket
would also sell at a price which would at least equal
the profit made in week 1. Figure 3 reflects the effects
on quantity-price elasticity which the supermarket
must face. Given a reduction in supply of 50% the su-
permarket would only increase prices by 34%. In such
a scenario the consumer would have to respond with
an elasticity of 1.446. If the real demand elasticity was
less, and the customers bought less, the supermarket’s
profits would be reduced.
It would seem that the asymmetry of risk, measured
by the demand elasticity which the supermarket must
face given variation in supply, may be the reason which
justifies the retailers’ willingness to increase prices in
line with rises in cost at origin in times of decreased
supply, and their reluctance to reduce prices accor-
dingly in times of increased supply.
Supplier-retail price spread and risk calculation
As an example, the supplier-retail price spread
(mt = prt – pst) has been calculated using real data of
tomato marketing in Almería (Spain)13. These prices
have been compared with the difference between real
sale prices in Andalusian supermarkets and prices ob-
tained by the producer14. In short, mt-real and mt-calcu-
lated are obtained, the latter being the result of conside-
ring the theoretical conditions, [1] and [2], to maintain
the profits of both supplier and retailer.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of mt and the harvest (stan-
dardized, base 100). Note that mt-real is larger than mt-
calculated (and vice versa) for weeks of peak produc-
tion. This is evidence, in the short term, of the lack of a
strategy on the part of the retailer to benefit their suppliers.
In addition, we have calculated the functional rela-
tionship qmt = f (prt) in order to then ascertain prob(εmt < εrt)
using some of the values εrt from Figure 3. The results
appear in Tables 3 and 4. The function used is the expo-
nential, and so the coefficient of the price variable will
be equal to εmt15. It can be seen that there is a very high
likelihood that demand will not respond as the retailer
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Figure 3. Relationship between the minimum elasticity requi-
red (in absolute value) and the % variation in marketed and sold
production.
13 Source: Association of Almerian Producers (COEXPHAL). Almería represents 50% of tomatoes sold by Spain and 89% of
Andalusia (weeks 45 to 23).
14 Source: Observatory of prices (Andalusian Regional Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).
15 To calculate prob(εmt < εrt) we must know that the variable will follow a t-student distribution with n-k-1 degrees of
freedom, where σ¯εmt is the standard deviation of the estimated coefficient, «n» the number of data in the sample and «k» the number
of variables included in the regression.
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would require to maintain profit margin for increases
in production above 20%.
Discussion
This paper analyzes differences in pricing behavior
in the marketing chain. In particular, it explores the
way retail prices adjust to an increase or decrease in farm
prices in the context of perishable products.
Numerous research studies have been addressed to
understanding why marketing margins for food products
have changed over time. They often use bargaining
power and cost adjustment to explain price asymmetry
and rigidity. Nevertheless, our study has attempted to
offer additional explanations, using an analytical fra-
mework in which these two main causes are simplified
in order to provide a more in-depth analysis of retail
price behavior. This analysis is based on the existence
of a pact between supplier and retailer to maintain their
margins, analyzing i) demand which absorbs the whole
supply as a simplified starting point, and ii) differences
between supply and demand which create a market risk
for the retailer. In both cases there is asymmetric price
behavior between retailer and supplier. Although both
initial assumptions are rather restrictive, they are com-
patible with a competitive market if we take into
account the trend to incorporate suppliers into the
retailers’ value chain (Marcus and Anderson, 2006) in
order to generate competitive advantages (Bhatnagar
and Teo, 2009).
The results show that these actions do not avoid
price asymmetry. At the same time, this work shows
the diff iculty in establishing agreements between
supplier and retailer that could give rise to mutual com-
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Figure 4. Comparison between real and calculated supplier-retail price spread (mt = prt – pst). Spanish tomato production and prices,
harvest 2008/2009.
Table 3. Estimation. Dependent variable: log(qmt )
Variable Coefficient
Constant 16.667 (0.000)
Log (prt) = εmt –2.971 (0.000)
Observations (n) 27
σ¯εmt 2.747
R2 0.505
R2 Adjusted 0.485
F-Stat 25.508 (0.000)
Durbin-Watson 1.759
The p-value appears in brackets.
Table 4. Calculation of probabilities
qt
|εmt | < 1.446 —— = –50% 0.004qo
qt
|εmt | < 2.603 —— = –10% 0.277qo
qt
|εmt | < 3.470 —— = 20%– 0.799qo
qt
|εmt | < 4.342 —— = 50%– 0.999qo
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petitive advantages. However, with this aim in mind,
our study shows that in this scenario the supplier and
retailer should try to minimize their variable costs and
coordinate to program supplies. Acting in this way
would considerably reduce the risk that the retailer runs
of not being able to sell part of the production, since
from this application we observe that a supermarket
would have to confront a high increase in price elasti-
city (risk) to compensate their marketing costs in a
situation of increases in supply. On the contrary, the
demand elasticity needed to maintain profit margins
stable drops as the shortage increases, or the marketing
costs are reduced.
In general terms, the present study could help to
explain why retailers are more willing to transmit in-
creases in prices at origin when there is a decrease in
supply, and less willing to do so when prices are lower
in times of more produce.
There are some limitations and extensions to this
study which may encourage further work. As it focuses
on short-term compensations, it would be of interest
to broaden the time scale. Along these lines, an in-
depth study is required of possible medium-term stra-
tegies (e.g. annual ones) for retailers to compensate
their suppliers for possible occasional (weekly) losses
that they incur.
In short, this study suggests the importance of mis-
cellaneous explanations of this asymmetric price
behavior (Meyer and Von Gramon-Taubadel, 2004),
and how it may originate due not only to market failures,
but also to variations in the supply and demand required
to maintain expected profit margins throughout the
marketing chain.
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Annex 1. Balance of supplier’s profit
Maintenance of the supplier’s prof it over time is
equivalent to: i.e. I˙ st (qt) = C˙st (qt).
But I˙ st (qt) = pst q˙t + pst q˙t and C˙st (qt) = cs q˙t. Therefore
[a1]
This identity represents an optimization situation
for the firm, since its marginal income will be the sa-
me as its marginal cost as a result of variations in the
quantity marketed. Using in [1] the fact that I˙ st (qt) ≡
Ist (qt) – Ist (qt–1) and C˙ st (qt) ≡ Cst (qt) – Cst (qt–1), we obtain
the following recurrence formula:
[a2]
In terms of initial price and initial quantity the equa-
lity [a2] become:
[a3]
Annex 2. Balance of retailer´s profit
Maintenance of the retailer’s profit over time is equi-
valent to: , i.e. I˙ rt (qt) = C˙rt (qt). This once
again represents an optimization situation for the re-
tailer, since its marginal income will be equal to its
marginal cost as a consequence of variations in the
amount marketed. Since I˙ rt (qt) = p˙ rt qt + prt q˙t and C˙ rt
(qt) = (cr + pst)q˙t + p˙ st qt, we have: 
p˙ rt qt + prt q˙t = (cr + pst) q˙t + p˙ st qt [a4]
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Identifying the marginal income and the marginal
cost as in annex 1, equation [a4] yields 
[a5]
In terms of initial price and the initial quantity the
above recurrence formula becomes
[a6]
Substituting [a2] in [a5] and [a3] in [a6], we obtain:
[a7]
[a8]
As an intermediate option, the retailer could deci-
de to compensate only the income from the supplier
instead of the profit. In this case cs = 0 and equations
[a2], [a3], [a5] and [a6] would be:
On the other hand, calculating the price-demand
elasticity which the retailer must withstand to fulfill
all the requirements is: 
[a9]
From [a9] we can see that: if ;
v being a constant, i.e., if the percentage growth rate
between periods is constant, the elasticity increases
(v > 0) or decreases (v < 0) exponentially over time (fas-
ter in the first case). The price prt will have the oppo-
site behavior. From [a6] and [a8] we can see that: if
v < 0 ⇒ Limt→∞εrt = 0 and Limt→∞ prt = ∞; if v > 0 ⇒ Lim-
t→∞εrt =∞ and Limt→∞ prt = prt = cr + cs. The evolution over
time of εst and prt can be seen in Figure A116. 
Annex 3. Supplier-retail price spread
According to equation [a5] we could represent the
supplier-retail price spread (mt = prt – pst) as a function
of the variations in marketed production (Fig. A2):
[a10]
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Figure A1. Evolution over time (weeks) of retail price-demand elasticity (εrt) and retail sale prices (prt).
16 The selling price in the supermarket will depend on changes in production. The trend shows that if there are continued increases
in production over time the price of the supermarket is stable and reflects only the costs of marketing. However, if there are continued
declines in production, the price of the supermarket grows exponentially. The market risk will move in the opposite fashion. The
asymmetry in the behavior of prices is intrinsic to the variation of production, so the prices there will never have a similar (symmetric)
conduct with production increases or production decreases.
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It can be seen that, given the assumptions of this
study (see also Annexes 1 and 2), the supplier-retail
price spread when production increases (v > 0) is sma-
ller than when it decreases (v < 0). Note that: if v > 0⇒
Limt→∞ mt = cr; v < 0⇒Limt→∞ mt =∞. However, in a mar-
ket situation (with unknown demand) and increases in
supply (the most problematic scenario) the retailer will
offset the risk by maintaining or even raising mt17. 
1
mt
Lack of supply
Excess of supply
pro-p
s
o
Crt
qt
qo
Figure A2. Variation of price between retailer and farmer.
17 This risk compensation mechanism might explain the behavior of margins (supplier-retail price spread) as expounded by Ben-
Kabbia and Gil (2008): «an increase in the origin-destination margin of Spanish tomato when the price at origin falls». These authors
detect a trend towards stabilization of price margins when considering their evolution over several periods. This may be due to an
implicit propensity of the retailers to maintain the profits of their suppliers. In short, it can be seen that an agreement between
supplier and retailer to maintain their profit constant, considering that demand absorbs the whole supply at the price established
by the retailer, would produce price asymmetry.
In other words, the proposed solution would give rise to the very same problem it is intended to solve. Moreover, if we take into
account demand that is different to supply, the retailer would have to adopt a series of strategies to compensate the risk, and these
strategies would also imply price asymmetry.
